The agent obtains a valid wildcard cert for *.<hash>.agent.unarr.app from the web broker (ACME DNS-01) so the https web player reaches it directly over HTTPS instead of the CloudFlare funnel. - internal/acme: generate EC P-256 key + CSR locally (private key never leaves the machine), fetch the signed chain from the broker, persist it atomically, NeedsIssue renewal check - daemon: generate + persist a stable agent_hash in config.toml; register before requesting the cert (broker ownership check needs the row); arm the HTTPS listener with the cert; 6h renewal poll hot-swaps it (no restart) - report httpsStreamPort + agentHash on register/sync - stream_server: emit Access-Control-Allow-Private-Network on PNA preflight so an https page can reach the agent on loopback / LAN
136 lines
4.5 KiB
Go
136 lines
4.5 KiB
Go
// Package acme handles the agent side of the per-agent direct-TLS feature
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// (plex.direct model). The agent generates and keeps its private key LOCALLY,
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// builds a CSR for *.<hash>.agent.unarr.app, and sends only the CSR to the
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// web-side broker (which runs the ACME order against Let's Encrypt via DNS-01
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// and returns the signed chain). The key never leaves the machine.
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//
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// File layout under the agent state dir:
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//
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// certs/agent.key ECDSA P-256 private key (PEM, persisted across renewals)
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// certs/agent.crt issued certificate chain (PEM, hot-reloaded by the stream server)
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package acme
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import (
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"crypto/ecdsa"
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"crypto/elliptic"
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"crypto/rand"
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"crypto/x509"
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"crypto/x509/pkix"
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"encoding/hex"
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"encoding/pem"
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"fmt"
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"time"
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)
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// GenerateHash returns a 32-hex-char (16-byte) high-entropy agent hash label.
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func GenerateHash() (string, error) {
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b := make([]byte, 16)
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if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("generate agent hash: %w", err)
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}
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return hex.EncodeToString(b), nil
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}
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// Paths returns the key/cert file paths under the agent state dir.
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func Paths(dataDir string) (keyPath, certPath string) {
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dir := filepath.Join(dataDir, "certs")
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return filepath.Join(dir, "agent.key"), filepath.Join(dir, "agent.crt")
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}
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// loadOrCreateKey returns the agent's persistent EC key, creating + persisting
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// it on first use. Reused across renewals so the cert always matches the key.
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func loadOrCreateKey(keyPath string) (*ecdsa.PrivateKey, error) {
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if data, err := os.ReadFile(keyPath); err == nil {
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block, _ := pem.Decode(data)
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if block == nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("agent.key is not valid PEM")
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}
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key, err := x509.ParseECPrivateKey(block.Bytes)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse agent.key: %w", err)
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}
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return key, nil
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}
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key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("generate EC key: %w", err)
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}
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der, err := x509.MarshalECPrivateKey(key)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("marshal EC key: %w", err)
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}
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if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(keyPath), 0o700); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("mkdir certs: %w", err)
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}
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pemBytes := pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "EC PRIVATE KEY", Bytes: der})
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if err := os.WriteFile(keyPath, pemBytes, 0o600); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("write agent.key: %w", err)
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}
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return key, nil
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}
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// BuildCSR ensures the persistent key exists and returns a PEM CSR requesting
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// the wildcard *.<hash>.<baseDomain> (plus the bare <hash>.<baseDomain> so a
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// future non-wildcard use still validates). baseDomain e.g. "agent.unarr.app".
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func BuildCSR(dataDir, hash, baseDomain string) (csrPEM string, err error) {
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keyPath, _ := Paths(dataDir)
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key, err := loadOrCreateKey(keyPath)
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if err != nil {
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return "", err
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}
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wildcard := "*." + hash + "." + baseDomain
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base := hash + "." + baseDomain
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tmpl := &x509.CertificateRequest{
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Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: wildcard},
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DNSNames: []string{wildcard, base},
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SignatureAlgorithm: x509.ECDSAWithSHA256,
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}
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der, err := x509.CreateCertificateRequest(rand.Reader, tmpl, key)
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if err != nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("create CSR: %w", err)
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}
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return string(pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE REQUEST", Bytes: der})), nil
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}
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// WriteCert persists the issued certificate chain atomically (temp file + rename)
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// so a concurrent reader (NeedsIssue, or the listener's GetCertificate reload)
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// can never observe a half-written PEM during a renewal.
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func WriteCert(dataDir, certPEM string) error {
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_, certPath := Paths(dataDir)
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if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(certPath), 0o700); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("mkdir certs: %w", err)
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}
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tmp := certPath + ".tmp"
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if err := os.WriteFile(tmp, []byte(certPEM), 0o644); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("write agent.crt: %w", err)
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}
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if err := os.Rename(tmp, certPath); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("rename agent.crt: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// renewBefore is how long ahead of expiry we proactively renew.
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const renewBefore = 30 * 24 * time.Hour
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// NeedsIssue reports whether we should (re)request a cert: true when the cert is
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// missing, unparseable, expired, or within renewBefore of expiry.
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func NeedsIssue(dataDir string) bool {
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_, certPath := Paths(dataDir)
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data, err := os.ReadFile(certPath)
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if err != nil {
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return true
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}
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block, _ := pem.Decode(data)
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if block == nil {
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return true
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}
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cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(block.Bytes)
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if err != nil {
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return true
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}
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return time.Now().Add(renewBefore).After(cert.NotAfter)
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}
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