c148cb8ce7
Phase 1 security audit follow-up: - Reject HLS session IDs that aren't safe filesystem components (regex allowlist) to defend against path traversal via a buggy or compromised server. Applied at StartHLSSession and at the /hls URL handler; invalid IDs share the 404 of unknown sessions so the accepted format isn't enumerable. - /health no longer leaks the active filename, taskID prefix or client IP to non-loopback callers. Uses net.IP.IsLoopback so IPv4-mapped IPv6 (::ffff:127.0.0.1) is recognised and the empty-string parse failure stops bypassing the boundary. - unrar/7z passwords now travel through stdin instead of -p<password> in argv, removing /proc/<pid>/cmdline disclosure. Control characters in the password are rejected up front so a hostile NZB cannot feed extra prompt answers. Both invocations are bounded by a 30-minute context to stop indefinite hangs if the tool ever decides to prompt. |
||
|---|---|---|
| .. | ||
| agent | ||
| arr | ||
| cmd | ||
| config | ||
| engine | ||
| library | ||
| mediaserver | ||
| parser | ||
| sentry | ||
| ui | ||
| upgrade | ||
| usenet | ||