Releases were shipping UNSIGNED: ship.sh never invoked sign-checksums, the
goreleaser pubkey ldflag defaulted to empty, and publish-cli-release.sh did not
upload a .sig — so the self-updater's signature check was silently skipped
(1.0.0-beta had no checksums.txt.sig). Make signing unconditional:
- internal/upgrade/signature.go: bake the canonical release public key as the
compiled-in default (public, safe to commit; removes the empty-env footgun).
- .goreleaser.yml: drop the pubkey ldflag (committed default is authoritative)
+ add a signs: block that runs scripts/sign-checksums over checksums.txt.
sign-checksums requires -key, so an unset RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY fails the build
instead of shipping unsigned.
- scripts/ship.sh: source RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY from ~/.config/unarr-release/signing.key
(or the env), die if absent, and assert checksums.txt.sig was produced.
Private key lives outside the repo (gitignored keyfile + operator's vault);
public key verified to match (priv[32:] == baked pubkey).
Phase 2 security audit follow-up. Three independent hardenings against
the unauthenticated daemon surface, the long-lived agent SSE stream
and the self-update channel.
UPnP is now opt-in. The stream port + /hls endpoints have no auth, so
publishing them on the WAN via the gateway was a default that exposed
active downloads to anyone scanning the operator's external IP. New
config downloads.enable_upnp (default false) gates the mapping; LAN
and Tailscale clients continue to work unchanged. A startup log makes
the new default visible.
The agent SSE reader now uses a bounded bufio.Scanner instead of an
unbounded ReadString. A hostile or buggy server can no longer grow
daemon memory by streaming a single line forever or by emitting
unbounded data: continuation lines — both are capped at 256 KiB and
1 MiB respectively, and an error is surfaced so SignalLoop reconnects.
Self-update now verifies an ed25519 signature over checksums.txt when
the binary was built with a release public key embedded (injected via
goreleaser ldflags from RELEASE_SIGNING_PUBKEY). The companion
scripts/sign-checksums runs in the release workflow when both the
public-key variable and the private-key secret are present, uploading
checksums.txt.sig next to the existing checksums file. Builds without
the embedded key continue to update with SHA256-only verification; a
--allow-unsigned flag is provided so users on a signed build can
still install pre-signing releases or recover from an accidental
unsigned release.
A new scripts/gen-release-key helper documents the one-time keypair
generation procedure required before flipping signing on.
