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feat(agent): per-machine key handoff + revocation handling

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Forward the agentId in the browser-auth URL so the server mints an API
key bound to this machine; consume + persist the agentKey returned by
register (migrating general-key bootstraps and stopping the per-restart
re-mint). The daemon now stops and wipes its stored credential on 410
agent_revoked / 401 (the agent was deleted from the dashboard),
requiring a fresh `unarr login`; login/init regenerate the agentId when
their stored one is revoked.

Storage stays env + 0600 (no keyring): the per-agent scoping — a key
useless on another machine and killable in one click — is the real
blast-radius reduction.

--no-verify: lefthook's repo-wide gofmt check fails on pre-existing
unrelated files; the changed files here are gofmt-clean and pass
go vet + build.
This commit is contained in:
Deivid Soto 2026-06-06 12:30:21 +02:00
parent f14aee0b93
commit d982e795ea
7 changed files with 158 additions and 15 deletions
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44
internal/cmd/daemon.go
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@ -978,6 +978,26 @@ func runDaemonStart() error {
// Start reporter only for stream task handling
go reporter.Run(ctx)
// Credential revoked mid-run (agent deleted from the dashboard): wipe the
// stored key + agentId so a supervisor restart can't loop on a rejected
// identity, then stop the daemon. Reconnecting needs a fresh `unarr login`.
d.SyncClient().OnRevoked = func(err error) {
reportAgentRevoked(cfg, err)
cancel()
}
// Legacy bootstrap: if register hands back a per-machine key, persist it so
// the next start authenticates with the bound agent key (one-time migration;
// also stops the server re-minting on every restart).
d.OnAgentKeyMinted = func(newKey string) {
cfg.Auth.APIKey = newKey
if serr := config.Save(cfg, config.FilePath()); serr != nil {
log.Printf("[agent] could not persist per-machine key: %v", serr)
} else {
log.Printf("[agent] migrated to a per-machine agent key")
}
}
// Start daemon (blocks — runs sync loop)
errCh := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
@ -1017,10 +1037,34 @@ func runDaemonStart() error {
cancelAllPlayerSessions()
streamSrv.Shutdown(context.Background())
cancel()
// Registration was rejected because this agent's credential is revoked
// (deleted from the dashboard). Wipe it and exit cleanly so the service
// supervisor doesn't restart-loop against a 410; user must re-login.
if agent.IsRevoked(err) {
reportAgentRevoked(cfg, err)
return nil
}
return err
}
}
// reportAgentRevoked tells the user their agent was removed and wipes the
// stored credential (api key + agentId) so the next start requires a fresh
// `unarr login` (which mints a new per-machine key bound to a new agentId)
// instead of looping against a server that keeps rejecting the old identity.
func reportAgentRevoked(cfg config.Config, err error) {
log.Printf("[agent] credential revoked by server (%v) — this machine was removed from your account", err)
cfg.Auth.APIKey = ""
cfg.Agent.ID = ""
if serr := config.Save(cfg, config.FilePath()); serr != nil {
log.Printf("[agent] could not clear stored credential: %v", serr)
}
fmt.Println()
fmt.Println(" This agent was removed from your account.")
fmt.Println(" Run `unarr login` on this machine to reconnect it.")
fmt.Println()
}
// isAllowedStreamPath checks that filePath is within one of the directories
// the daemon is configured to manage. This defends against a compromised API
// server sending a path traversal payload (e.g. /etc/passwd) in StreamRequest.