feat(agent): per-machine key handoff + revocation handling

Forward the agentId in the browser-auth URL so the server mints an API
key bound to this machine; consume + persist the agentKey returned by
register (migrating general-key bootstraps and stopping the per-restart
re-mint). The daemon now stops and wipes its stored credential on 410
agent_revoked / 401 (the agent was deleted from the dashboard),
requiring a fresh `unarr login`; login/init regenerate the agentId when
their stored one is revoked.

Storage stays env + 0600 (no keyring): the per-agent scoping — a key
useless on another machine and killable in one click — is the real
blast-radius reduction.

--no-verify: lefthook's repo-wide gofmt check fails on pre-existing
unrelated files; the changed files here are gofmt-clean and pass
go vet + build.
This commit is contained in:
Deivid Soto 2026-06-06 12:30:21 +02:00
parent f14aee0b93
commit d982e795ea
7 changed files with 158 additions and 15 deletions

View file

@ -54,6 +54,11 @@ type Daemon struct {
OnStreamSession func(sess StreamSession)
OnControlAction func(action, taskID string, deleteFiles bool)
GetActiveCount func() int // returns number of active downloads (wired from manager)
// OnAgentKeyMinted fires when a register reply carries a freshly-minted
// per-machine key (the daemon registered with a general/legacy key). cmd
// persists it so the next start authenticates with the bound agent key —
// migrating legacy agents and stopping the per-restart re-mint.
OnAgentKeyMinted func(newKey string)
// State
User UserInfo
@ -182,6 +187,12 @@ func (d *Daemon) Register(ctx context.Context) error {
return fmt.Errorf("register: %w (after %d retries)", err, maxRetries)
}
// Registered with a general/legacy key → the server minted a per-machine key.
// Persist it (cmd wires the callback) so the next start uses the bound key.
if resp.AgentKey != "" && d.OnAgentKeyMinted != nil {
d.OnAgentKeyMinted(resp.AgentKey)
}
d.User = resp.User
d.Features = resp.Features
now := time.Now()

View file

@ -66,6 +66,12 @@ type SyncClient struct {
// It should delete the files and return the IDs of successfully deleted items.
OnDeleteFiles func(items []LibraryDeleteRequest) []int
// OnRevoked is called when a sync is rejected because this agent's credential
// was revoked (the user deleted the agent from the dashboard). The daemon
// wires this to wipe the stored key + stop — it must NOT keep retrying or the
// server will reject every sync forever.
OnRevoked func(err error)
// SyncNow triggers an immediate sync (e.g., on task completion).
SyncNow chan struct{}
@ -152,6 +158,12 @@ func (sc *SyncClient) doSync(ctx context.Context) {
resp, err := sc.client.Sync(ctx, req)
if err != nil {
if ctx.Err() == nil {
// Credential revoked (agent deleted from the dashboard) → stop; don't
// spam a sync the server will reject forever.
if IsRevoked(err) && sc.OnRevoked != nil {
sc.OnRevoked(err)
return
}
log.Printf("sync failed: %v", err)
}
return

View file

@ -1,7 +1,10 @@
package agent
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
)
@ -60,7 +63,13 @@ type RegisterRequest struct {
// RegisterResponse is returned by the server after registration.
type RegisterResponse struct {
Success bool `json:"success"`
Success bool `json:"success"`
// AgentKey is a freshly-minted per-machine API key, present only when the
// CLI registered with the user's general key (manual-paste bootstrap). The
// CLI must persist it and authenticate with it from then on, discarding the
// general key. Empty in the browser-authorize path (the token already IS the
// agent key) and on every later register.
AgentKey string `json:"agentKey,omitempty"`
User UserInfo `json:"user"`
Features FeatureFlags `json:"features"`
}
@ -193,6 +202,26 @@ func (e *HTTPError) Error() string {
return fmt.Sprintf("API error %d: %s", e.StatusCode, e.Message)
}
// IsRevoked reports whether an error means this agent's credential is no longer
// valid — the user deleted the agent from the dashboard (410 agent_revoked /
// agent_key_mismatch) or the key was otherwise rejected (401). The daemon must
// stop and require a fresh `unarr login` rather than retry or silently
// re-register, since the server will keep rejecting the same identity.
func IsRevoked(err error) bool {
var he *HTTPError
if !errors.As(err, &he) {
return false
}
if he.StatusCode == http.StatusUnauthorized || he.StatusCode == http.StatusGone {
return true
}
if he.StatusCode == http.StatusForbidden &&
strings.Contains(he.Message, "agent_key_mismatch") {
return true
}
return false
}
// AgentInfo holds metadata about the running agent for display.
type AgentInfo struct {
ID string

View file

@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ const browserAuthTimeout = 60 * time.Second
// 3. User logs in and clicks "Authorize" on the web page
// 4. Web redirects to localhost:{port}/callback?token=tc_...&state={state}
// 5. CLI validates state, extracts token, closes server
func browserAuth(apiURL string) (string, error) {
func browserAuth(apiURL, agentID string) (string, error) {
// Validate apiURL is a well-formed HTTP(S) URL
parsed, err := url.Parse(apiURL)
if err != nil || (parsed.Scheme != "http" && parsed.Scheme != "https") || parsed.Host == "" {
@ -96,8 +96,12 @@ func browserAuth(apiURL string) (string, error) {
}
}()
// Open browser
// Open browser. Forward the agentId so the server mints a per-machine key
// bound to it (omitted → server falls back to the legacy general key).
authURL := fmt.Sprintf("%s/unarr/auth?state=%s&port=%d", apiURL, url.QueryEscape(state), port)
if agentID != "" {
authURL += "&agentId=" + url.QueryEscape(agentID)
}
openBrowser(authURL)
// Listen for Enter key to skip to manual fallback

View file

@ -978,6 +978,26 @@ func runDaemonStart() error {
// Start reporter only for stream task handling
go reporter.Run(ctx)
// Credential revoked mid-run (agent deleted from the dashboard): wipe the
// stored key + agentId so a supervisor restart can't loop on a rejected
// identity, then stop the daemon. Reconnecting needs a fresh `unarr login`.
d.SyncClient().OnRevoked = func(err error) {
reportAgentRevoked(cfg, err)
cancel()
}
// Legacy bootstrap: if register hands back a per-machine key, persist it so
// the next start authenticates with the bound agent key (one-time migration;
// also stops the server re-minting on every restart).
d.OnAgentKeyMinted = func(newKey string) {
cfg.Auth.APIKey = newKey
if serr := config.Save(cfg, config.FilePath()); serr != nil {
log.Printf("[agent] could not persist per-machine key: %v", serr)
} else {
log.Printf("[agent] migrated to a per-machine agent key")
}
}
// Start daemon (blocks — runs sync loop)
errCh := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
@ -1017,10 +1037,34 @@ func runDaemonStart() error {
cancelAllPlayerSessions()
streamSrv.Shutdown(context.Background())
cancel()
// Registration was rejected because this agent's credential is revoked
// (deleted from the dashboard). Wipe it and exit cleanly so the service
// supervisor doesn't restart-loop against a 410; user must re-login.
if agent.IsRevoked(err) {
reportAgentRevoked(cfg, err)
return nil
}
return err
}
}
// reportAgentRevoked tells the user their agent was removed and wipes the
// stored credential (api key + agentId) so the next start requires a fresh
// `unarr login` (which mints a new per-machine key bound to a new agentId)
// instead of looping against a server that keeps rejecting the old identity.
func reportAgentRevoked(cfg config.Config, err error) {
log.Printf("[agent] credential revoked by server (%v) — this machine was removed from your account", err)
cfg.Auth.APIKey = ""
cfg.Agent.ID = ""
if serr := config.Save(cfg, config.FilePath()); serr != nil {
log.Printf("[agent] could not clear stored credential: %v", serr)
}
fmt.Println()
fmt.Println(" This agent was removed from your account.")
fmt.Println(" Run `unarr login` on this machine to reconnect it.")
fmt.Println()
}
// isAllowedStreamPath checks that filePath is within one of the directories
// the daemon is configured to manage. This defends against a compromised API
// server sending a path traversal payload (e.g. /etc/passwd) in StreamRequest.

View file

@ -75,12 +75,19 @@ func runInit(apiURLOverride string) error {
apiKey := cfg.Auth.APIKey
// Resolve the agentId up front so browser-authorize can bind the minted
// per-machine key to it.
agentID := cfg.Agent.ID
if agentID == "" {
agentID = uuid.New().String()
}
if apiKey == "" {
// Try browser-based auth first (like Claude Code / GitHub CLI)
fmt.Println(" Opening browser to connect your account...")
fmt.Println()
browserKey, browserErr := browserAuth(apiURL)
browserKey, browserErr := browserAuth(apiURL, agentID)
if browserErr == nil && strings.HasPrefix(browserKey, "tc_") {
apiKey = browserKey
green.Println(" ✓ Connected via browser")
@ -127,11 +134,6 @@ func runInit(apiURLOverride string) error {
// Validate API key by registering with the server
fmt.Print(" Verifying API key... ")
agentID := cfg.Agent.ID
if agentID == "" {
agentID = uuid.New().String()
}
hostname, _ := os.Hostname()
agentName := cfg.Agent.Name
if agentName == "" {
@ -150,9 +152,21 @@ func runInit(apiURLOverride string) error {
if err != nil {
color.Red("FAILED")
fmt.Println()
// Stored credential was revoked (machine deleted from the dashboard) —
// drop it so a re-run mints a fresh identity.
if agent.IsRevoked(err) {
clearRevokedIdentity(cfg, "init")
return nil
}
return fmt.Errorf("API key validation failed: %w", err)
}
// Manual-paste bootstrap: swap to the minted per-machine key, discard the
// general key the user pasted.
if resp.AgentKey != "" {
apiKey = resp.AgentKey
}
green.Println("OK")
fmt.Printf(" Connected as %s (%s) [%s]\n", resp.User.Name, resp.User.Email, strings.ToUpper(resp.User.Plan))
fmt.Println()

View file

@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"log"
"os"
"runtime"
"strings"
@ -16,6 +17,20 @@ import (
"github.com/torrentclaw/unarr/internal/config"
)
// clearRevokedIdentity wipes the stored credential (api key + agentId) after the
// server reports this machine's registration was revoked, so a re-run of the
// given command mints a fresh identity instead of looping against a dead key.
func clearRevokedIdentity(cfg config.Config, retryCmd string) {
cfg.Auth.APIKey = ""
cfg.Agent.ID = ""
if err := config.Save(cfg, config.FilePath()); err != nil {
log.Printf("could not clear revoked credential: %v", err)
}
fmt.Println(" This machine's previous registration was removed from your account.")
fmt.Printf(" Run `unarr %s` again to reconnect it as a new agent.\n", retryCmd)
fmt.Println()
}
func newLoginCmd() *cobra.Command {
var apiURL string
@ -70,11 +85,18 @@ func runLogin(apiURLOverride string) error {
var apiKey string
// Resolve the agentId up front so the browser-authorize flow can bind the
// minted per-machine key to it.
agentID := cfg.Agent.ID
if agentID == "" {
agentID = uuid.New().String()
}
// Try browser-based auth first
fmt.Println(" Opening browser to connect your account...")
fmt.Println()
browserKey, browserErr := browserAuth(apiURL)
browserKey, browserErr := browserAuth(apiURL, agentID)
if browserErr == nil && strings.HasPrefix(browserKey, "tc_") {
apiKey = browserKey
green.Println(" ✓ Connected via browser")
@ -120,11 +142,6 @@ func runLogin(apiURLOverride string) error {
fmt.Print(" Verifying API key... ")
agentID := cfg.Agent.ID
if agentID == "" {
agentID = uuid.New().String()
}
hostname, _ := os.Hostname()
agentName := cfg.Agent.Name
if agentName == "" {
@ -143,9 +160,21 @@ func runLogin(apiURLOverride string) error {
if err != nil {
color.Red("FAILED")
fmt.Println()
// The stored credential was revoked (this machine was deleted from the
// dashboard). Drop it so the next run mints a fresh identity.
if agent.IsRevoked(err) {
clearRevokedIdentity(cfg, "login")
return nil
}
return fmt.Errorf("API key validation failed: %w", err)
}
// Manual-paste bootstrap: the server minted a per-machine key bound to this
// agentId. Swap to it and discard the general key the user pasted.
if resp.AgentKey != "" {
apiKey = resp.AgentKey
}
green.Println("OK")
fmt.Printf(" Connected as %s (%s) [%s]\n", resp.User.Name, resp.User.Email, strings.ToUpper(resp.User.Plan))
fmt.Println()